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THE RELATIONSHIP OF PROCEDURE TO
SUBSTANCE IN CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS
UNDER SECTION 1983: NO CAUSE
FOR COMPLAINT?*
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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the Supreme Court has expanded civil rights
actions' in two crucially important ways. First, the Court held that
damage actions may be brought against government entities for civil
rights violations. 2 This ruling extends to all government entities except the states, which remain protected by the explicit provisions of
the eleventh amendment. 3 Although the scope of entity liability is
"Mr. Mayor,' said K., 'you always call my case one of the smallest, and yet it
has given hosts of officials a great deal of trouble, and if, perhaps, it was unimportant at the start, yet through the diligence of officials of Sordini's type it has grown
into a great affair. Very much against my will, unfortunately, for my ambition
doesn't run to seeing columns of documents, all about me, rising and crashing
together, but to working quietly at my . . . [job].'
'No,' said the Superintendent, 'it's not at all a great affair, in that respect you've
no groundfor complaint-it'sone of the least important among the least important.
The importance of a case is not determined by the amount of work it involves; you're
far from understanding the authorities if you believe that. But even if it's a question
of the amount of work, your case would remain one of the slightest; ordinary
cases-those without any so-called errors, I mean-provide far more work and far
more profitable work as well.'
F. KAMA, Tie CASTLE 85 (1954).
"A.B., Princeton University; J.D., Georgetown University; Professor of Law, Seton Hall
University School of Law. The author acknowledges the competent and diligent research assistance of Marc Clemente, class of 1981.
1 This article only discusses actions under the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. §§
1981-1988 (1976). Most of these actions are brought under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act
which states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
Id. § 1983.
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
The eleventh amendment protects states from federal court suits brought without the
states' consent. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). It provides that "[t]he Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
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still evolving, the basic concept has had, and will have, a strong
salutary effect upon actions to protect constitutional rights. Second,
the Court has limited the immunity enjoyed by government officials
in the discharge of their duties by narrowly restricting absolute immunity to legislators 4 and judges5 engaged in their official capacities, and
to prosecutors engaged in the presentation of criminal cases in court.!
In all other cases, government officials are protected at most by a
qualified immunity, 7 which may be lost upon proof of malice, intentional deprivation of constitutional rights," or arguably, negligence
under appropriate circumstances. Furthermore, even this qualified
immunity will not protect a government entity from liability for the
conduct of high level government officials engaged in promulgating
official policy.9
Together, these developments greatly enhance the potential for a
successful civil rights damages action. This potential can be realized,
however, only if there are complementary developments in procedural areas to remove obstacles which now substantially delay and
often completely frustrate redress by the federal courts. Attorneys
who have engaged in civil rights litigation will agree that there are
several phases of the case where the complexity or uncertainty of the
procedural law greatly exacerbates the difficulties of preparing for
trial on the merits. For example, at the beginning of the case the
defendant may attack the court's jurisdiction to hear the case upon the
ground that the federal court ought to exercise its discretionary power
of abstention. In addition, there is often a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted,' 0 the motion in turn being evaluated according to a strict,
pro-defense standard." Finally, there is often a motion for summary
2
judgment based upon res judicata and/or collateral estoppel.'1
The result of these procedural sticking points may be months or
even years of delay, during which time the plaintiff is deprived of the
opportunity to conduct discovery or otherwise proceed to trial. When
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
4 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). See Gravel v. United States; 408 U.S. 606,
616 (1972). It should be noted, however, that while the Court reaffirmed the absolute immunity
of Congressmen, it also extended immunity to activities of legislative aids which would be
privileged if performed by the legislator. Id. at 616-17.
5 Dennis v. Sparks, 101 S.Ct. 183 (1980).
8 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976).
7 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1980).
s See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
0Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980).
10 Fwo. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

1"See notes 73-77 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 131-34 infra and accompanying text.
12
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the case does get into the discovery phase, the plaintiff typically finds
that virtually all attempts to obtain information necessary to establish
liability are countered with claims of privilege, resulting in further
delay and expense, and frequently in a denial of the discovery request.
Some of these procedural problems are legitimate products of the
substantive issues in civil rights cases. Many others are either anachronisms left from days when the substantive law was harsher, or simply
the unfortunate result of a judicial failure to realize the substantial
adverse impact that procedural rulings may have upon the plaintiff's
right to a just, fair, and speedy resolution of his claims. This article
examines the less useful procedural obstacles confronting a Civil
Rights Act plaintiff in an effort toward recommending policies more
in line with substantive law developments.
SUBSTANTIVE LAW DEVELOPMENTS

In Civil Rights Act litigation, two classes of substantive issues
have tended to recur without definitive resolution: (1) whether individual liability is based upon ordinary negligence, or upon intent or
malice; and (2) whether derivative liability should be imposed upon
high ranking government officials and/or upon the government entity
itself, and thus upon the taxpayers. Although this article is concerned
with procedural aspects of civil rights cases, a brief discussion of the
state of the law in these two substantive areas is a necessary prerequisite to an understanding of the relationship between substance and
procedure.
The notion that actual malice, or the deliberate intent to harm
the victim, is an essential element of a civil rights claim stems from
confusion in early decisions concerning the scope of immunity based
upon governmental privilege.' 3 The Supreme Court has consistently
approached the area of immunity by distinguishing between absolute
4
immunity for a limited number of legislative and judicial officials,'
and qualified immunity for virtually all other government employees.' 5 For the latter group, immunity depends upon actions

" O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322
(1974). See generally P. BATOn, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRno & H. WEcHsLEl, HAtr & WECHSLE'S
THE FEDERAL Couirrs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM%
926-1049 (2d ed. 1973).
" See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-29 (1976) (state prosecuting attorney acting
within scope of duties absolutely immune from action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)); Gravel v.
United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1972) (absolute immunity afforded federal legislators);
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967) (absolute immunity afforded judges for acts within
judicial jurisdiction); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (state legislators).
" The Court has extended qualified immunity on a case-by-case basis to a variety of officials
including: prison officials, Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1978); state hospital
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taken in "good faith"--in the absence of good faith, immunity is
lost.' 8 Under this model, malice plays only a peripheral role. Of
course, actual malice will destroy qualified immunity. 7 Even actual
malice, however, will not destroy absolute immunity. 8 More importantly, malice is not the only factor that will overcome qualified
immunity; often a lesser showing will suffice. In fact, determining
exactly what will overcome qualified immunity remains a largely
unanswered question.
The Supreme Court has in recent years flirted with the idea of
imposing liability for negligent violation of constitutional rights, but
has thus far stopped just short of doing so.' 9 Two cases are particularly illustrative of the Court's consideration of negligence in Civil
Rights Act cases: Procunierv. Navarette20 and Baker v. McCollan.'
In Procunier, the plaintiff was a jailhouse lawyer who complained that prison officials interfered with his mail. 22 As is typical in
civil rights actions, the litigation was protracted: the claim arose in
1972; the action was filed in 1974; and in 1978, the parties were still
in the pleading stage dealing with defense motions for dismissal and
summary judgment. The plaintiff, although proceeding pro se, had
nevertheless filed a complaint sophisticated enough to allege "knowing disregard" of state regulations, "bad faith disregard" of the plaintiffs rights, and "negligent and inadvertent" misapplication of state
regulations.

23

The Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction to determine whether
the complaint alleging "negligent interference with a claimed constitutional right" stated a claim under section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act. 24 Although the Court found the complaint insufficient, the
substantive standard it applied is instructive: officials with qualified
immunity 2s are liable if they knew or should have known of a constiofficials, O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576-77 (1975); school board members, Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 314-22 (1975); executive officers performing discretionary acts,
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974); and police officers, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.

547, 557 (1967).
16 E.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
7 Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 571 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'8 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 n.12 (1975) (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
553-54 (1967)).
19 For a discussion of potential § 1983 liability in crime prevention, see Note, Police Liability
for Negligent Failureto Prevent Crime, 94 HA.v. L. REv. 821, 829-31 (1981).
20 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
21 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
2 434 U.S. at 557-58.
23 Id.

21 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). 434 U.S. at 559.
23 Compare Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) with Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967) and other cases listed in Procunier, 434 U.S. at 561.
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tutional right which they violated by their conduct.26 In the case
before it, the majority agreed that the first amendment right to be free
from interference with one's mail, relied upon by the plaintiff, was
not yet "clear" when the defendants acted, and that accordingly they
should not be punished for their good faith attempts to enforce the
27
existing laws.
It appears then that the Court would sanction liability for a
government official who negligently failed to know the laws affecting
the discharge of his official duties. Indeed, in his dissent, Justice
Stevens said,"[l]ike the Court, I shall assume, without deciding, that a
guard who negligently misreads regulations and improperly interferes
with a prisoner's mail has violated section 1983."28
In a more recent decision, Parrattv. Taylor,29 the Court again
eschewed a negligence standard in a case involving a prisoner's mail;
however, that case merely involved a claim of negligent mishandling
of mail with resultant loss of property, which the Court held did not
constitute a taking of property without due process under the fourteenth amendment. There was no evidence of unconstitutional mail
policies for prisoners, or of ill will or other malice toward the plaintiff
by prison officials. 30
In Baker v. McCollan,3' the Court again approached the question whether acts of negligence give rise to civil rights liability. The
plaintiff in Baker was held in jail for eight days 32 in a classic case of
mistaken identity. 33 Although the prisoner insisted from the begin26 434 U.S. at 562. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
27 434 U.S. at 563-64.
'" Id. at 569 n.4. Moreover, the dissent argues for a standard that would impose liability
even for negligent acts-such as the mere mishandling of prisoner mail-provided the defendants acted with specific ill feeling toward the plaintiff or "carelessly disregarded the standards
which their superiors directed them to follow." Id. at 571-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"1 101 S.Ct. 1908 (1981).
30Id. at 1916. Four Justices concurred in Parrattin opinions reinforcing the narrow scope of
the holding, and Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that due process required prison
officials to advise the prisoner of any state claims procedures available to him after the loss was
discovered. Id. at 1923 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
31 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
32Plaintiff was arrested on December 26, moved from one county to another on December
30, and was released January 3. Only the sheriff in the latter county was sued. Id. at 141. The
majority's statement that as a result of the transfer he was held for only three days is misleading.
" The circumstances surrounding the arrest were as follows: Leonard and Linnie McCollon
were brothers. At some point Leonard had obtained a copy of Linnie's driver's license. When
Leonard was arrested on narcotics charges, he displayed the license, identified himself as Linnie,
and signed various documents as Linnie. Shortly thereafter, he was released on bail. For an
undisclosed reason, "the bondsman [then] sought and received an order allowing him to surrender Leonard, who everyone thought was Linnie." Id. at 150. Although the real violator was
Leonard, a warrant for the arrest of Linnie was issued based on the false identification supplied
by Leonard.

6
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ning that the wanted man was in fact his brother, the sheriff failed to
make any effort to verify his prisoner's identity. 34 When a file photograph of the wanted man was eventually examined, the error was at
once apparent and the prisoner was released. 35 Although the Court
ruled that the complaint failed to state a claim,36 its discussion of the
defendants' conduct during the three days the plaintiff was in jail is
ambiguous. It may indicate that the negligent failure to respond to a
prisoner's claim of mistaken identity is not actionable under section
1983; or it may merely suggest that the defendants' actions did not
37
amount to negligence.

Thus, the Court has not, at least in the view of its majority
opinion writers, yet dealt with clearly negligent conduct resulting in
the deprivation of life, personal liberty, or other fundamental constitutional rights. In the recent cases before it, the Court majority-or
plurality-has avoided the ultimate issue by concluding that there
was no negligence under the particular averments presented in the
complaint. Although the narrow ground of decision may be preferred,
particularly when the Court is so obviously divided on the major
issue, it is unfortunate that the effect of these opinions is to prevent
plaintiffs from presenting all of the relevant evidence in support of a

3, Id. at 141-42.
3 Id. at 141.
36 Specifically, Justice Rehnquist found that the plaintiff had failed to establish a constitutional violation which is a threshold requirement of section 1983 actions. Id. at 140. Because the
arrest warrant was facially valid, there was no fourth amendment violation. Id. at 143-44.
Moreover, in the majority's view "a detention of three days" did not amount to a deprivation of
liberty "without due process of law." Id. at 142.
37 The latter interpretation loses some force in view of the majority's repeated reference to
potential tort liability for false imprisonment under state law, id. at 142, 146, though one may
argue that false imprisonment, like trespass, is generally a matter of strict liability.
Only four justices joined the majority opinion in Baker. Justice Blackmun, in a concurring
opinion, flatly found that the sheriff was not negligent and that the deputies were not defendants. Id. at 148 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He expressly left open the possibility of liability for
more severe misconduct, such as "deliberately and repeatedly refus[ing] to check the identity of a
complaining prisoner against readily available mug shots and fingerprints." Id.
Justice Marshall, in a brief dissent, characterized the arrest as an intentional act, thus
obviating any consideration of the negligence issue. Id. at 149 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens' dissent, on the other hand, abounds with language suggesting the applicability of a
negligence analysis. For example, reference is frequently made to the lack of general procedures
aimed at reducing the risk of imprisonment by mistaken identity. Id. at 150, 152, 156 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). In short, Justice Stevens strongly implies that careless failure to protect recognized constitutional rights should be actionable under section 1983. While the opinion stops short
of recognizing liability for "occasional mistakes [that] may be made by conscientious police
officers operating under the strictest procedures," id. at 155 (Stevens, J., dissenting), the concept
of negligence is nonetheless impliedly recognized.
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negligence theory, and thus to delay even further the day when the
Court must ultimately rule whether negligent violation of constitutional rights states a claim under section 1983. Thus, for the time
being, the question of liability for negligence under the Civil Rights
Act remains an open one. The Court may well move toward a standard which recognizes liability based on only certain types of negligence, but not others. 38 Thus, a managerial official's failure to even
inquire into relevant constitutional law areas directly affecting prisoners, or others for whom he is responsible, may be actionable even
though negligent. Similarly, the failure to establish any procedures or
to promulgate any regulations to protect clearly established constitutional rights may give rise to a section 1983 claim. On the other hand,
the negligence of lower level employees in discharging their duties
may be actionable, if at all, only under state law.
In the area of derivative liability, decisions by the Supreme Court
have until recently prompted a wealth of speculation about the proper
allocation of responsibility among various types of civil rights defendants. 39 It is now possible to put together several different Court
decisions and to answer these questions. The answer, we shall see,
depends upon the identity and function of the defendant in question.
There are three types of defendants in civil rights cases: the active
tortfeasor; his supervisors and managers sued as individuals; and the
entity of government which employs the tortfeasor. The active tortfeasor, whether a low-level employee or a high ranking official, is
liable subject to absolute or qualified immunity. 0
The derivative liability of managerial officials was of considerable interest in the era of Monroe v. Pape,4 ' which held that the entity
itself could not be sued in federal court. Under Monroe, an action
against low level employees would not be expected to produce a
collectible judgment. Nor would injunctive relief be adequate to engender institutional reforms. Accordingly, plaintiffs were anxious to
develop legal theories that would fix liability at the highest levels of

31 See discussion of Justice Marshall's analysis in Baker v. McCollan, supra note 37. Justice

Stevens has suggested that "generalized malice," that is, ill will or hostility to a particular
individual, may form the basis of liability for even negligent infringement of that individual's
rights. See Procunier, 434 U.S. at 572 (Stevens, J., dissenting), where Justice Stevens states: "A
jury might . .. find that the defendants' animus toward Navarette so tainted their handling of
his mail that the good-faith defense should be denied even with respect to harm caused by their
negligence." Id.
3' See generally Sheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
40 See notes 4-9 supra and accompanying text.
41 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
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government, in order to enhance the potential extent of the remedy.
When Monroe was overruled, that need became less pressing. Today,
the two decisions most relevant to an understanding of entity liability,
i.e., the responsibility of the local government entity to pay damages
for violations of section 1983 by agents or employees of that entity, are
Monell v. Departmentof Social Services42 and Owen v. City of Independence.43 In those two cases, together with Rizzo v. Goode,4 4 the
Court, often sharply divided, carved out the rough contours of the
principles that will guide developments in this area of law during the
coming decade. Most notably, the Court held that local government
entities may be liable for damages in actions under the Civil Rights
Acts. 45 Additionally, the Court determined that entity liability
will depend upon a finding that high level officials were involved in
the tortious actions by means of official policy making, ratification of
wrongful conduct, or failure to uncover or correct abuses by lower
level employees. 46 Finally, the Court held that entity liability, unlike
individual liability, is not subject to a qualified immunity for good
faith mistakes committed by government officials in the discharge of
their official duties, although entities are not liable for punitive dam47

ages.

42 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
43 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
44 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
45 436 U.S. at 690. The Court's decision in Monell expressly overruled Monroe v. Pape.
insofar as that case held that local governments were immune from section 1983 liability. Id. at
664-89.
46 Id. at 694; Owen, 445 U.S. 657.
17 445 U.S. at 650. The Court also noted that the availability of defenses in civil rights
actions is solely a matter of federal law, and is not subject to limitation or modification by states
through tort claims statutes or judicial decision. See Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602,
607 (7th Cir. 1973) (majority opinion authored by then Circuit Judge Stevens). See also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1976). This principle, however, is limited by the Court's
approach to defining those defenses. In Monell and in the recent decision of City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2748 (1981), the Court's analysis starts from the assumption that
Congress was aware of the status of sovereign immunity in 1870, and intended to preserve that
immunity to the extent that it was consistent with the purposes of the Act. Thus, the Court is
indirectly taking into account state law at the time the Civil Rights Act was written by inferring
legislative intent to recognize that law. The Act itself calls for the application of state law to fill
in the procedural gaps in civil rights actions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
It should also be noted that in the City oJ Newport case, the Court held that a government
entity is not liable for punitive damages in Civil Rights actions. 101 S. Ct. at 2762. In so holding,
the Court reasoned that even where government officials have acted with malice, both the
history of sovereign immunity and public policy militate against granting the successful plaintiff
a windfall in excess of compensation for his losses at the expense of the taxpayers who would be
responsible for the judgment. Id. at 2756-62. In City of Newport, a local governing body had
withdrawn a concert permit based upon spurious reasons and in the face of advice from counsel
that its actions were unconstitutional and unsupportable. Id. at 2751-52. The Court affirmed an
award of compensatory damages against the city, since the wrongful actions were committed by
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Thus, after Monell and Owen civil rights actions may be maintained against individual government officials, the managers who
supervise those officials, and/or the government entity which employs
those officials. Although these decisions appear to facilitate the civil
rights action, procedural hurdles continue to hamper many valid
claims. The following section discusses these procedural impediments.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES

A. Jurisdictionand Abstention by Federal Courts
For a variety of reasons, claims under the Civil Rights Act may
be adjudicated in either state or federal court. First, state and federal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over civil rights claims. 48 Second,
civil rights violations may also give rise to state tort claims under
common law or statute. 49 Finally, constitutional violations may be
asserted and determined in criminal proceedings, state civil proceedings to determine status, ownership, or the like, or in myriad other
contexts that may result in a judicial ruling that directly or indirectly
affects the civil rights claim. ° As a result of this overlapping jurisdiction, the initial procedural problem for the plaintiff is whether the
federal court will accept jurisdiction over his civil rights claim when a
related state court proceeding is also involved. The body of precedent
concerning whether a federal court should, in the exercise of its discretion, decline jurisdiction under such circumstances is known as the
doctrine of abstention.,'
This doctrine has undergone considerable refinement in the last
ten years, and the current status of abstention is set forth in Moore v.
Sir=.52

In that case, Texas authorities had commenced a child ne-

glect proceeding in state court, and had exercised statutory powers to
remove a child from the home pendente lite.5 3 The parents comhigh ranking officials as defined in Owen, but reversed the award of punitive damages. Id. at
2762. Perhaps significantly, the punitive damage award against the individual council members
was not affected by the decision. Thus, the Court again recognized the validity of entity liability
to make whole an individual injured by unconstitutional official action.
11 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357
U.S. 275 (1958); T&M Homes, Inc. v. Mansfield Twp., 162 N.J. Super. 497, 393 A.2d 613 (Law
Div. 1978).
" See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2748, 2752 n.6 (1981). See
also T&M Homes, Inc., v. Mansfield Twp., 162 N.J. Super. 497, 393 A.2d 613 (Law Div. 1978).

-1 See. e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); see notes 131-34, infra and accompanying
text.
" The principle of abstention was first articulated by the Court in the context of criminal
proceedings in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

s 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
IId. at 419-21.
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menced a federal court action alleging that the Texas statute empowering a governmental department to take custody of their children
violated their right to due process under the fourteenth amendment.. 4 The Supreme Court held that abstention was appropriate,
affirming the principal of Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., s5 that abstention is not restricted to criminal cases, but extends to any civil
proceeding 56-at least where the state is a party to that proceeding 5 7 -so long as there is an adequate opportunity to raise the
constitutional claims in the case pending in state court. 58
Procedurally, a federal court's decision to abstain in a civil rights
case can be implemented in two ways. The court may simply dismiss
the action, upon the supposition that the state proceedings will dispose
of the entire controversy. Or, if the court believes that civil rights
questions may still exist unresolved after the state case is decided, the
court may temporarily stay further proceedings in federal court, giving the plaintiffs the option to move to vacate that stay and prosecute
their federal claims when the state proceedings are concluded. This
latter approach is clearly appropriate where the state proceedings do
not provide an adequate opportunity for presentation of the federal
civil rights claims, or when the plaintiffs have invoked the jurisdiction
of the federal court prior to commencement of state proceedings.
From a procedural standpoint, it is significant that the Court in
Moore remanded with instructions that the complaint be dismissed.5 9
If for any reason the plaintiffs had occasion to return to federal court,
they would be required to commence a new action, effect service of
new process, and, in short, incur substantial additional expense, inconvenience, and delay. Whether the Court intended to cast doubt
upon the plaintiff's substantive right to return to federal court by its

s Id. at 422.
420 U.S. 592 (1975).
'6 It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court was careful to describe the civil
proceeding in Moore as one "in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes." Id. at 604.
Whether this is a qualification on the Court's holding or merely dicta is unclear.
37 Two other cases which expand the scope of the types of civil actions to which abstention is
applicable are Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (state's civil contempt process), and Trainor v.
Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (state's law governing attachment actions).
The adequacy of the parents' opportunity to present their constitutional claim in Aloore
was sharply challenged by the four dissenters, who argued that the parents' allegation of being
unconstitutionally deprived of custody of their child during a forty-two day period was of no
direct concern to the state judge deciding a child neglect proceeding and passing upon the
propriety of permitting the parents to regain custody of their child. 442 U.S. at 438-39 (Stevens.
J., dissenting).
S9 Id. at 435.
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order is more difficult to assess. It is clear from the Court's prior
decisions that plaintiffs had a right to go directly to federal court

rather than to the state court with their constitutional claim, provided
they could win the race to the courthouse. 0 Furthermore, under
England v. Board of Medical Examiners,6' plaintiffs had the right to
return to an abstaining federal court for an adjudication of their
constitutional claims after state court proceedings were concluded. It
was, therefore, both unnecessary and inappropriate for the Court in
Moore to dismiss the complaint and so require the plaintiffs to re-com-

mence their federal action. Based on precedent, the case should have
been retained on the federal court docket unless dismissed at the
plaintiff's discretion. This conclusion is further supported by the specific facts of the case-facts which formed a major basis for Justice
Stevens' dissent.6 2 Prior to commencing the federal action, the parents had attempted for forty-two days, with the assistance of counsel,
to obtain a hearing in state court seeking return of their child. 3 In
fact, the delay was so extensive that the dissenters would have found

that, despite Younger v. Harris,6 4 abstention was inappropriate due
solely to the inadequacy of the state remedy. When the parents turned
to the federal court and obtained emergency relief and a stay of state
court proceedings, the case was again delayed while the Supreme

Court reviewed the decision of the three judge district court.

5

Add-

ing to these frustrations was the inappropriate and unfair dismissal of

0 The dissent, citing Monroe, discussed this option available to the plaintiff. Id. at 437
(Stevens, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Mitchum v.Foster,
407 U.S. 225 (1972); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
-1 375 U.S. 411 (1964). In Allen v. McCurry, 101 S. Ct. 411 (1980), the Court expressly
recognized the continued validity of the holding in England. Id. at 418 n. 17. In the England case
the Court determined that when a plaintiff wins the race to the courthouse, but is met with
abstention, he has the option of returning to federal court for final resolution of his federal
claims provided he informs the state court that he is reserving the right to do so. See text
accompanying notes 67 & 71 infra. See generally Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and
Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1133, 1318-19 (1977).
62 442 U.S. at 435 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Joining in dissent were Justices Brennan, Stewart,
and Marshall.
ld. at 437 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
4

See note 51 supra.

11 422 U.S. at 440-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, "'Younger abstention
in these circumstances does not merely deprive the plaintiffs of their right to initiate new claims
in the form of their choice. Far more seriously, it deprives them of any right at all." Id. at 440
(Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973).
Gibson arose under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-2284 (1970) (sections 2281-2282 repealed 1976),
which established three-judge district courts to review all applications to enjoin a state statute as
unconstitutional, and provided, inter alia, for mandatory review by the Supreme Court of
decisions to grant such an injunction.
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the federal action. Ironically, this aspect of the case did not even
receive mention in the dissent.
In general, it seems that where a federal court abstains from the
exercise of jurisdiction over a civil rights claim, the preferred procedure should be a retention of jurisdiction with a stay of its own
proceedings. 66 The plaintiffs would then have the option to return to
federal court without the delay and inconvenience- or prejudice in
the case of the statute of limitations-of commencing a new case in
order to exercise the rights that exist under England.
B. Pleadingsin Civil Rights Cases
In civil rights actions, the complaint has assumed an untoward
and frustrating prominence for the plaintiff. Although in the normal
lawsuit the complaint serves merely to notify the proper defendants of
the action and to give them a rough idea of the transactions and events
they will be litigating, 67 the civil rights complaint is often the most
significant legal document in the whole docket. Five years or more
may pass while the legal sufficiency of the complaint is pondered and
considered by both trial and appellate courts. There are a variety of
plausible explanations for this emphasis. For one thing, it has been
quite common in civil rights cases (most certainly prior to Monell) for
the plaintiff to seek solely or primarily injunctive relief against government officials, restraining continued or future violations of constitutional rights. When a plaintiff seeks the extraordinary remedy of an
injunction against a government officer, he must show a clear legal
right to the relief sought.68 Under those circumstances, scrutiny of
the complaint for legal sufficiency is not only justifiable, but obligatory.
Another explanation may be found in the federal habeas corpus
statutes, which are often an alternative vehicle for the assertion of
claims arising under the Civil Rights Act. As discussed more fully
below, the federal statute6 9 imposes explicit specificity requirements
" If the court is concerned about stale or moot cases on its docket, the court could add a
requirement that the parties report periodically on the status of the state case.
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See generally 2A Moore's FEDERAL PRA CTcE 1 8.03 (2d ed.

1981).
" This caution is reinforced by the traditional reluctance of Congress to permit federal court

restraint of state officials in any but the most extreme cases. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-2283 (1976)
(sections 2281-2282 repealed 1976) (anti-injunction act); id. § 2284 (1976) (old three judge court

act); id. § 2283 (1976) (prohibition against enjoining state tax procedures). Although in private
cases the plaintiff's legal right need not always be clear, e.g., Semmes Motors, Inc., v. Ford
Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1970), the same is not true when a court is asked to enjoin a
government official.
19 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2242-2243 (1976).
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on habeas corpus petitions, and permits dismissal before a responsive
pleading is filed if those requirements are not met. 70 A third, and
perhaps related explanation, is that civil rights actions are frequently
fraught with volatile political issues, and are, in the opinion of many,
an affront to the government and an unwarranted intrusion into its
operations. Vindication of the government position after extensive
discovery and a long and embarrassing trial may be a pyrhhic victory,
while dismissal at the complaint stage is quick, tidy, and quiet. A
fourth reason for the emphasis on pleadings is that the allegations in
civil rights actions may often describe or suggest quasi-criminal or
otherwise objectionable conduct on the part of the defendants. At
best, a negligent failure to follow the law, and at worst, outright
malice, are the basis for the bulk of civil rights claims. Procedural
requirements generally require that allegations of fraudulent or criminal conduct be made in specific terms; 71 to permit these allegations to
be made carelessly and vaguely may be to submit a conscientious
official to public humiliation and exposure when in fact he has been
doing his very best to serve the public good. The possibility of a
"strike" suit to force the government to settle rather than to permit
these abuses to run their course creates a powerful source of pressure
to weed out the frivolous and baseless actions at the outset. Finally,
the evolving standards governing liability and the scope of immunity,
and the uncertain limits of federal court jurisdiction, give rise to their
own pressure to require a plaintiff to have at least a coherent legal
theory before being permitted to delve into government records and
interrogate government officials, searching-or fishing-for damaging material to lay before a jury.
Taken together, these factors have produced a situation that
places upon the civil rights plaintiff a heavy pleading burden. That
burden may be expressed in terms of specificity, or burden of pleading, or more generally in terms of "adequacy." In any case, the
functional result is the same: while the plaintiff is confronted with
attacks upon the sufficiency of the complaint, he is almost always
precluded from initiating pre-trial discovery. And, since in civil rights
cases the plaintiffs case literally comes from the defendants' files, this
preclusion is a harsh and often unfair handicap, one that is not shared
by the antitrust plaintiff, the contract plaintiff, or the tort plaintiffeven if the tort claim is against a government entity. The following

10See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
"' Such evidence is essential to show knowledge by high ranking officials, to show intent and
malice, to attack credibility, etc. See, e.g., Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Pa.
1973).
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sections further explore and evaluate the use of specificity and burden
of pleading requirements in civil rights cases. Specifically, three major
issues will be discussed: (1) whether civil rights complaints, at least

where the plaintiff has a lawyer, are held to a greater degree of
specificity than other claims; (2) what allegations are necessary in
order to set forth a claim against the government entity or against the
supervisory and managerial officials with responsibility for the conduct of the active tortfeasor; and (3) who bears the burden of pleading

on the issue of official immunity.
1. Specificity Requirement
Although no provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires it, 72 several courts have imposed upon plaintiffs in civil rights
cases a higher than usual standard of specificity for the statement of a
claim. In the Third Circuit, this approach has been explicitly

adopted, 73 and consistently applied in cases where the civil rights

74
plaintiff is represented by counsel.

In some instances, the specificity requirement is used in effect to
require the plaintiff to furnish a bill of particulars, i.e., specific
statements concerning both evidentiary matters and legal contentions.

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, these functions should be
served by contention interrogatories 75 and other discovery devices. In
that way, the plaintiff would be free to commence his own discovery

U Rule 8 stipulates that a complaint must contain a "short and plain" statement of the claim
showing the plaintiff is entitled to relief. FED. R. Civ. P. 8. In certain areas such as fraud, greater
specificity is required, but Fm. R. Civ. P. 9 does not impose any such requirement upon civil
rights actions. In fact, rule 9(b) provides that allegations concerning malice (often an important
part of a civil rights case) or any other state of mind may be made in general terms. A number of
courts, however, have overlooked the rules in dismissing civil rights complaints under FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Albany Welfare Rights Org. v. Schreek, 463 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973) (action dismissed under rule 12(b)(6) for failure to allege
specific facts in support of claim of acts done "in retaliation").
73 The case most frequently cited for this proposition is Kaufman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270,
1275 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846 (1970). Judge Gibbons, sitting in the Third Circuit,
has repeatedly disagreed, however, with the notion that something beyond adequate notice to
the defendants is required. E.g., Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 924 (3d Cir.
1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring and dissenting).
71The standard is less burdensome for the pro se claimant based upon the Supreme Court's
holding in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court recently reaffirmed this
principle in Hughes v. Rowe, 101 S. Ct. 173, 176 (1980), though most of the pro se complaint in
Hughes was dismissed as "insufficient."
's Interrogatories designed to elicit more specific statements of the plaintiffs claim are
clearly proper, and are widely employed in all types of litigation. See Sundstrand Corp. v.
Standard Killsman Indus. Inc., 488 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1973). See generally 4A Moore, supra
note 67, at 33.17(2.2).
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program, and could obtain court permission to defer furnishing his
legal contentions until the latter phases of the case. A court may
subvert this natural state of affairs, however, by dismissing the complaint with leave to amend. This leaves the plaintiff on the horns of a
dilemma. If he complies with the order, he has accepted the delay and
difficulty of trying to flesh out his claim before discovery. If he stands
his ground, he must appeal the dismissal and risk a determination
that, having failed to even attempt an amendment, the dismissal will
7
be with prejudice.
Professor Moore7 7 traces the policy basis for the specificity requirement to a Connecticut district court opinion, Valley v. Maule, 8
in which the court stated that:
As a general rule notice pleading is sufficient, but an exception has
been created for cases brought under the Civil Rights Acts. The
reason for this exception is clear. In recent years there has been an
increasingly large volume of cases brought under the Civil Rights
Acts. A substantial number of these cases are frivolous or should be
litigated in the State courts; they all cause defendants- public
officials, policemen and citizens alike-considerable expense, vexation and perhaps unfounded notoriety. It is an important public
policy to weed out the frivolous and insubstantial cases at an early
stage in the litigation, and still keep the doors of the federal courts
79
open to legitimate claims.
Note that there are three separate ideas embodied in this analysis: (1)
many civil rights actions are frivolous; (2) many non-frivolous civil
rights actions should be litigated in the state courts rather than the
federal courts; and (3) civil rights actions subject governments and
their employees to a good deal of hardship and embarrassment.
The rationale of Valley v. Maule, however, is unpersuasive. It is
true that the number of civil rights cases in federal courts_.has increased. This is due to expanded concepts of substantive liability as
well as the elimination of certain-though by no means all-jurisdictional limitations on civil rights actions. The statement that "substan-

'" See e.g.. Hacker v. Beck, 32.5 Mass. 594, 91 N.E.2d 832 (1950). My colleagues, Professors
Risinger and Denbeaux, have recently encountered the Third Circuit's specificity standard. After
filing a complaint consisting of forty-one paragraphs, they were required to file an even more
specific amended complaint. After eight months of motions, the judge concluded that "'whilethe
point is very close, we believe plaintiff has pleaded with sufficient specificity." Bragton v.
Rendell, No. 80-4629 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 1981) (citing Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d
920 (3d Cir. 1976)).
" Moore, supra note 67, at 1 8.17 [4.-1].
74 297 F. Supp. 958 (D. Conn. 1968).
"I Id. at 960.
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tial" numbers of civil rights cases are "frivolous" is not supported by
any empirical evidence in the decision, although it appears to be an
opinion held by many federal judges. Yet, even assuming that civil
rights claims have been extensively misused, most judges and defense
attorneys would concede that the great majority of the frivolous cases
are those filed pro se. The strict pleading rule, however, is not applied
to those cases, and thus misfires in its attempt to weed out frivolous
claims.
There are several responses to the argument that many civil
rights cases should be litigated in the state courts, but the most persuasive is that Congress has vested the federal courts with jurisdiction to
hear civil rights claims, and accordingly they have an obligation to
accept these cases. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall:
With whatever doubts, whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no
more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given,
than to usurp that which is not given.80
In times of crowded dockets most federal judges would probably
prefer to eliminate some types of cases. Certainly diversity jurisdiction
results in its share of unimportant lawsuits that "ought" to be in state
courts.8 ' Yet in diversity cases, the federal courts unquestioningly
accept cases even where there is a substantial suspicion of abuse, and
82
confine corrective action to an occasional assessment of costs.
In any event, civil rights claims have already been significantly
limited by principles such as abstention, 83 continued recognition of
the eleventh amendment in civil rights cases against the states, 84 and
application of res judicata8 5 and collateral estoppel. 88 These principles not only prevent re-litigation of claims raised in related state
court proceedings, but can also bar litigation of claims that could have
been raised in state courts. The use of a strict specificity pleading rule
as an additional method of declining jurisdiction over civil rights cases

80Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821). Jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
(1976). See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
81See generallyCurrie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. Cm.L.
REv. 268 (1969); Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction. 41 HARV. L. REV. 483

(1928).

82 See, e.g., Deutsch v. Hewes Street Realty Co., 359 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1966).
3 See notes 53-71 supra and accompanying text.

81See Quern v. Jordon, 440 U.S. 332, 334-43 (1979); Edelman v. Jordon, 415 U.S. 651
(1974); note 4 supra and accompanying text.
85 See Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1977).
80 See Allen v. McCurry, 101 S.Ct. 414-17 (1980); notes 131-34 infra and accompanying text.
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is, at the least, disingenuous and, at worst, unjust since it may preclude the plaintiff from going into state court following dismissal.
The final justification for greater specificity in civil rights
claims-that litigation against government officials must be supported by general tax revenues, and that it has a disruptive effect
upon the conduct of government affairs 7-has great appeal to the
taxpayer, but is in fact another version of the frivolity argument. If
that action has merit, the cost of defending and paying the judgment
is a legitimate cost of government, and should be treated as such.
Moreover, an attorney undertaking a case must certify that the action
is not frivolous and is subject to judicial sanctions if he abuses his
office.8 8 Given the crucial importance of information possessed by
defendants in civil rights cases, it is simply unrealistic for the court to
attempt to separate the wheat from the chaff until after discovery has
been had. As has been cogently argued by commentators, the proper
approach is to evaluate the worth of the plaintiffs claim on summary
judgment or at trial. 89 Only in this way can the courts actually strike
the delicate balance called for in Valley of deterring frivolous actions
while "keep[ing] the doors of the federal courts open to legitimate
claims." 90
If this stricter pleading standard for civil rights cases were confined to the Third Circuit, the situation might be treated as an aberration, although a sufficiently serious one to merit the attention of the
Supreme Court. Yet, in many decisions of other circuits, civil rights
cases have been dismissed at the pleading stage on the grounds that
the complaint was vague or conclusory. This reasoning appears to
operate as an application of the Third Circuit standard by another
name. 9' One suspects that in civil rights actions challenging police
conduct, criminal procedures, treatment of prisoners, or the like, the
stricter specificity standard for civil rights complaints is linked to the

close parallel to habeas corpus proceedings.9 2 Both statutes recognize
8,

See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
88 Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the pleadings be signed by
counsel to certify that "to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground
to support it." FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
*g E.g.. Risinger, Honesty in Pleadingand its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1976).
297 F. Supp. at 960-61.
u, For a representative sampling, see Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 424 F.2d 818 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1975); Albany Welfare Rights Org. v. Schreck, 463 F.2d 620
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973); Birnbaum v. Trussel, 347 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.

1965); Schram v. Krishcell, 84 F.R.D. 294 (D. Conn. 1979); Moore, supra note 67, 8.17 [4.-1],
at 8-178 n.1l.
.2 18 U.S.C. §§ 2242-2255 (1976).
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claims based on violation of constitutional rights by state officials.
Accordingly, claims by state prisoners may be couched in terms of
either proceeding, or both. 93 In habeas corpus actions, the federal
statute 94 provides that the petitioner must set forth the specific facts

entitling him to relief, and explicitly authorizes the court to dismiss
sua sponte "if it appears from the application that the . . .person
detained is not entitled to [the relief sought]." 95 There is no counter-

part in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which authorizes or
96
justifies imposition of this standard in civil rights cases.
A strong argument can be made against this specificity standard
in habeas corpus proceedings. 97 Regardless of the merits of that
controversy, however, it simply does not follow that the same standard of specificity should be incorporated into civil rights procedure
where there is no statutory requirement. Although prisoners' claims
comprise a fair number of the civil rights actions filed each year, they
are by no means the most significant. The civil rights action has
significantly broader application, and is used to obtain review of
government action at all levels. Furthermore, habeas corpus procedures are expressly recognized as exceptions to the normal requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, whereas section 1983
actions are not. 98 Thus, there is no justification for imposing the
higher standard of pleading on civil rights claims. Nonetheless, the
decisions support the belief that such a higher standard should be
employed and the habeas corpus crossover may be a reason for the
courts' approach in this area.
2. The Specificity Requirement in Pleading Entity Liability

A particular area of concern in civil rights litigation is the pleading requirements for the statement of a claim under the developing
theory of entity liability, set forth in Owen v. City of Independence. 99 Substantively, we have seen that entity liability will depend
E.g., Allen v. McCurry, 101 S. Ct. 411 (1980).
28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1976).
Is Id. See generally Martinez v. United States, 344 F.2d 325 (10th Cir. 1965); United States
v. Harpole, 249 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 850 (1959). Over 90 percent of
federal habeas corpus and section 2255 (28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976) is analogous provision for
federal prisoners) proceedings filed in 1968 were dismissed on the pleadings. Developments in
the Law-FederalHabeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1038, 1174 n.132 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Developments].
0' See generally Developments, supra note 95, at 1173-79.
97 See Developments, supra note 95, at 1174-79.
11 Cf. Goldsby v. Harpole, 249 F.2d 417, 419-20 (5th Cir. 1957)(Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have no application other than by analogy to habeas corpus proceeding unless by
express statutory requirement).
0 445 U.S. at 657.
g3

94
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upon a showing that the injury to the plaintiff was caused by some
official policy, practice or custom,100 or by the active participation, or
ratification, of the misconduct by high level officials, or their failure
to correct systematic patterns of misconduct.10' The initial procedural juncture at which this problem may arise is, again, a defense
motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The issue
is whether the plaintiff will be given the opportunity, through pretrial discovery, to obtain relevant evidence from the government defendants in order to establish a link between the wrongdoing of the
low level "line" employee and the major officials who employ and
supervise his work.
The Second Circuit has taken the position that the complaint
must contain more than an allegation of a single incident of misconduct in support of a claim of official policy. 02 Some trial court
decisions have gone further and required a detailed specification of
the actual incidents and an analysis of the causal tie between those
incidents and the claim of official approval of the wrongdoing.10 3 The
reasoning behind decisions imposing strict specificity requirements on
civil rights plaintiffs alleging entity liability is essentially the same as
0 4 In fact, in Smith v. Abrogio, 05
that set forth in Valley v. Maule.
Judge Newman, elsewhere a staunch supporter of civil rights claimants, 06 ruled that civil rights plaintiffs should not be permitted to
undertake the complex and protracted discovery necessary in order to
of a
establish the basis for a claim of entity liability in the absence
07
officials.1
level
high
by
misconduct
of
preliminary showing
These decisions do not address the fundamental problem. The
unfortunate reality is that in any type of civil case discovery can be
costly and time-consuming. In products liability, medical malpractice, antitrust, and myriad other types of actions, the parties utilize
discovery to uncover the substance of the legal claims and defenses,

100 E.g.,

Afonell. 436 U.S. at 690. See text accompanying notes 41-46 supra.

101 E.g., Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 377.

101In Turpin v.Mailet, 619 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1980), the court found that "a policy could not
ordinarily be inferred from a single incident of illegality such as a first arrest without probable
cause or with excessive force." Id. at 202.
101 E.g., Schramm v. Krischell, 84 F.R.D. 294 (D. Conn. 1979); Smith v. Ambrogio, 456 F.
Supp. 1130 (D. Conn. 1978); Leite v. City of Providence, 463 F. Supp. 585 (D.R.I. 1978). But
see Popow v. City of Margate, 476 F. Supp. 1237 (D.N.J. 1979) (allegation of recklessness or
gross negligence sufficient to preclude summary judgment in favor of defendant).
104297 F. Supp. at 960. See text accompanying notes 75-77 supra.
105456 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Conn. 1978).

106See Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage
Remedy for Law Enforcers"Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447 (1978).
107 456 F. Supp. at 1137.
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often involving parties who are only tenuously connected to the central controversy. If this breadth of discovery is unjust and unworkable, then it ought to be curbed across the board, and not just in cases
involving civil rights claims. Dismissal of the claim against the entity
does not necessarily dispose of the action; rather, the dismissal merely
reduces the claim to one against the individual employee who was the
active wrongdoer. Moreover, since the search for additional defendants is a universally accepted discovery function, the plaintiff would
be able to conduct depositions of government officials and, through
use of freedom of information statutes' 018 and/or document discovery
under rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 10 9 seek information to support an amendment of the complaint. 110
Nonetheless, it appears that the specificity requirement in entity
liability cases is rapidly gaining acceptance as a device for preventing
plaintiffs from obtaining the discovery necessary to support their
claims in the civil rights area. This is inconsistent with the approach
in other areas of civil litigation, and has the effect of complicating and
delaying these proceedings without substantially reducing the number
of claims which eventually will be brought against such entities.
3. Burden of Pleading Immunity
Compared to the harsh specificity standards adopted by some2
lower courts,"' particularly in cases with claims of entity liability,"
the pleading rule concerning the various immunity defenses has followed a more salutary path. Although the substantive law concerning
the immunity of government officials for acts performed in the discharge of their official duties has received extensive treatment, the
important procedural question of the burden of pleading on this
crucial issue was only recently resolved by the Supreme Court.
In Gomez v. Toledo,1 3 the Supreme Court unanimously held
that in civil rights cases the burden of pleading immunity as a defense

108
E.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
109FE. R. Crv. P. 34(a). Rule 34(a) permits any party to require that his adversary produce
for inspection and copying, documents and other tangible items that are relevant to the litigation.
110 The statute of limitations would not necessarily bar an amendment to the complaint to
include another party. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) permits relation back in many situations so long as
the party to be added knew of the claim within the statutory period. Additionally, many states
recognize that accrual of a claim occurs upon discovery of the wrong. E.g., Farrell v. Votator
Div. of Chemtron Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 299 A.2d 394 (1973).
"I See notes 73-77 supra and accompanying text.
"'

113

See notes 100-05 supra and accompanying text.
100 S. Ct. 1920 (1980).
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rests upon the defendant, and reversed the lower court's ruling that
lack of good faith is an essential averment if the complaint is to state a
claim sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 4 After a brief review of the
development of substantive immunity in civil rights cases, Justice
Marshall, writing for the Court, held that the statement of a claim
under section 1983 requires only two allegations: that there was deprivation of a federal right, and that the deprivation was caused by a
person acting under color of law.1 5
Turning to the immunity question, Justice Marshall's opinion
then followed the classic model for analyzing a burden of pleading
problem by first ascertaining where the burden of persuasion at trial
lies. After looking at both the historical"" and policy 1 7 tests for
resolving the issue, Justice Marshall apparently decided, without explicitly stating, that the burden of persuasion should be upon the
defendants.118 As he apparently reasoned, the burden of pleading,
following the burden of persuasion, must also be upon the defendants.
Only two factors weigh against the conclusion that Gomez totally
disposes of the burden of persuasion issue: Justice Marshall's failure to
explicitly state the obvious conclusion; and Justice Rehnquist's one
sentence concurrence based upon his "reading" of the majority opinion as leaving open the burden of persuasion issue for another day. 119
Even if Justice Rehnquist's reading is correct, placing the burden
of pleading immunity upon defendants still serves several important
purposes. A rule 12(b)(6) motion may properly be addressed to the
sufficiency of the complaint alone, while issues raised by an affirmative defense pleaded in the answer under rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure' 20 must be resolved by motion for judgment on the
pleadings, by motion for summary judgment,' 2 ' or at trial. The effects
of this procedure are significant to the flow of section 1983 litigation

"I FED.
"s

R.Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 100 S. Ct. at 1922.

100 S. Ct. at 1923.

,18
The historical test focuses on whether the matter would have been considered one of
confession and avoidance at common law, that is, whether the matters seemed more or less to
admit the general complaint and yet to suggest why there was no answer. Id. at 1924 n.8
(quoting PROcrINoS, WASHINGTON AND NEW Yoruc CITY INsTrrYTES ON THE FEDEAL RuO.ES 49
(1939)).
"7 The policy test turns on whether knowledge of facts relevent to immunity are within the
exclusive control of the defendants. Id. at 1924.
'18 100 S.Ct. at 1924.
119 Id.
"0 FED.
'21

R.Civ. P. 8(c).

FED. R.Civ. P. 56.
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in three respects. First, defendants claiming immunity are obliged to
file their answers before the motions begin, thus opening the door to
discovery. Whether the prevalence to pre-answer motions in this type
of litigation is in part a dilatory tactic can be debated. The fact is that
this skirmishing does substantially delay determination of cases on the
merits. Secondly, at least in qualified immunity situations, the plaintiff should be afforded a full opportunity to conduct a pre-trial discovery in an effort to meet any motion for summary judgment based
upon the defendant's showing of good faith. Finally, since liability for
civil rights violations is subject to different and sometimes inconsistent
defenses on behalf of the actual wrongdoers, their supervisors, or the
government entity, 22 by shifting the burden of pleading to the defendants, the court has reduced the confusion that arises when several
or all of the defendants join in a single rule 12(b)(6) motion. Under the
procedure announced in Gomez, each defendant should be required
to set forth the precise basis for the defense claimed, either in the
answer or in response to contention interrogatories during pre-trial
discovery.
Placing the burden of pleading immunity on the defendant has,
therefore, greatly increased the plaintiff's ability to use pre-trial discovery and the pleadings to delineate the complex substantive issues
involved in the various immunity questions without being subject to
undue delay and the risk of unwarranted dismissal at the very outset
of the action.
This is by no means meant to concede the major point concerning
the burden of proof on the question of immunity at the trial itself. The
Court's decision in Gomez should be read as based upon an underlying determination that the defendant, possessed of all the salient
information pertaining to qualified immunity, bears the burden of
proof on the issue at trial. More importantly, the majority decision
explicitly reaffirms the principle that section 1983 is "remedial legislation" which is to be liberally construed and applied to maximize its
potential. 12 3 Placing the burden of proving facts constituting an immunity defense on the defendant is fully consistent with this principle.
The majority opinion in Dennis v. Sparks124 strongly intimates
that this is the route the Court will take. In that case, a state judge
had issued an injunction enjoining allegedly corrupt practices. 25 After
122 See notes 4-9 supra and accompanying text.

123100 S. Ct. at 1923.
124101 S. Ct. 183 (1980).
125 Id. at 185. The judge had "enjoined the production of minerals from certain oil leases
owned by respondents." Id.
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a state appellate court had dissolved the injunction, an action for
damages was brought in federal court under section 1983 against both
the judge and his alleged co-conspirators.1 2 The trial court dismissed
the complaint under rule 12(b)(6), holding that the judge had absolute immunity, 2 7 and that his private co-conspirators fell within the
zone of that immunity. The court of appeals reversed as to the co-conspirators' immunity 28 and the Supreme Court sustained the reversal.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice White squarely stated that
"the burden is on the official claiming immunity to demonstrate his
entitlement." 29 The Court went on to hold that a judge's absolute
immunity from civil damage actions under section 1983 did not ex30
tend to private individuals who acted in concert with that judge.
The Court noted that the co-conspirators were not judicial employees
31
who were essential to the judge's discharge of his office.
Gomez and Dennis, taken together, indicate that the Court
would place the burden of proving immunity based on government
privilege upon the defendants in a section 1983 action. 32 This position is consistent with the analysis of several lower courts. For example, in Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 33 the court of appeals held that:
[I]n Section 1983 actions, the burden is on the defendant official
claiming official immunity to come forward and to convince the
trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . official
34

immunity should attach.1

C. CollateralEstoppel
In addition to interposing defenses based upon immunity and
lack of jurisdiction, civil rights defendants frequently claim that the

121 Id. "Essentially the claim was that the injunction had been corruptly issued as the result
of
a conspiracy between the judge and the other defendants, thus causing a deprivation of property, i.e., two years of oil production, without due process of law." Id.
127 Id.
I" The court of appeals first affirmed the trial court's decision, then, on reconsideration en
banc, reversed the decision "insofar as it had dismissed claims against the defendants other than
the judge." Id. at 185-86.
"29 Id. at 187.
'" Id. at 186. The Court also pointed out that criminal prosecution for judicial conduct under
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), remains a valid alternative. 101 S. Ct. at 188.
3' 101 S. Ct. at 187. The Court thus distinguished Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606

(1972).
"2'See Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Procunier,suggesting that defendants who carelessly disregard their superiors' directives "would be unable to make the threshold showing
necessary to establish good faith." 434 U.S. at 572 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1 538 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1976).
'3
Id. at 61-62.
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federal action is barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. These
doctrines are particularly relevant in civil rights cases for two reasons.
First, many civil rights claims are based upon facts which may also
give rise to a claim under state tort law due to the dramatic expansion
of government liability under state common law and state tort claims
statutes.'35 Accordingly, some aspects of a civil rights claim may have
been previously litigated in a state tort action, with or without consid6
eration of possible federal claims. 13
In addition, many civil rights
claims arise in contexts involving actions by government officials
which entail the commencement of state criminal, regulatory, or
other "prosecutorial" proceedings before a civil rights action is
brought. Again, the consideration of constitutional claims in such
proceedings is often not clear on the record, although there may have
been some opportunity to present those claims to the state tribunal.
The issues remaining available for federal consideration accordingly
present a problem in civil rights cases. 137
If the civil rights plaintiff voluntarily submits his federal claims
to the state court during the state proceeding, he is precluded from
re-litigating those claims in a subsequent federal action.1 3 When,
however, the civil rights plaintiff has been involuntarilysubjected to
prior state proceedings, the application of collateral estoppel becomes
more problematical in view of the argument that he should at least
have one opportunity to present his federal claims in federal court for
adjudication. Yet, in recent years the Supreme Court has opted for
limiting this right.
In Allen v. McCurry,

3

the Court continued its efforts to cut

down parallel state and federal litigation of constitutional claims, at
least those arising in criminal trial situations. McCurry had been
convicted in state court of narcotics possession and assault 40 after

135 See generally IA C. ANTIAu, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW, ch. 11 (1979).

138State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over federal civil rights claims. E.g.. Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
I" This problem does not arise in the case of state administrativeproceedings, because of the
exhaustion requirement. See generally Annot., 47 A.L.R. Fed. 15 (1980). A claimant who
voluntarily seeks state court review of an adverse administrative determination may, however,
have a subsequent federal action dismissed based upon collateral estoppel. Mitchell v. National
Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1977) (judicial affirmance of adverse decision by state
agency charged with enforcement of discrimination provisions precluded subsequent civil rights
action).
138 E.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 157-58 (1979); England v. Louisiana State
Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 419 (1964).
139101 S. Ct. 411 (1980).
1 0 Id. at 414. The latter charge resulted from a dispute between the defendant and the police
who conducted the search. Id.
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losing a suppression hearing in which fourth and fourteenth amendment claims were raised.' 4 ' McCurry then sued the police officers
and the police department in federal court under section 1983.142 The
trial court held that McCurry was collaterally estopped from raising
constitutional claims, and granted summary judgment for the defendants. 143 The court of appeals, after noting that federal habeas corpus
relief was precluded under Stone v. Powell,144 reversed on the ground
that the federal courts have a special duty to protect constitutional
rights and that the section 1983 action was McCurry's only available
remedy. 145
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals.
After reviewing the history and policy of the Civil Rights Acts, 146 the
Court concluded that there was no inherent incompatibility between
the general concept of collateral estoppel and the protection of constitutional rights in federal court actions under section 1983. 47 Furthermore, the Court declined to accept the idea that every civil rights
plaintiff has a right to one chance in federal court to sustain his
constitutional claim. The Court could find no support in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Acts for a standard that differs from the
ordinary tort case, and held that the assertion and litigation of that
claim in a state proceeding may preclude subsequent relitigation of
the issue in any other forum. 4 8
The Court was similarly unpersuaded that civil rights claims
should be treated under the same standard as federal habeas corpus
proceedings. The Court noted that, while both the language of the
habeas corpus statute, and its purpose, i.e., release from unlawful
confinement, support the Court's refusal to apply collateral estoppel
in such situation,1 4 no parallel justification for a similar doctrine
141
142

Id.

143

Id.

Id.

14- 428 U.S. 465 (1976). In Stone v. Powell, the Court held that where the state has provided a

defendant with a full and fair opportunity to raise his fourth amendment claim, the constitution
does not require that he be allowed to present it again at a habeas corpus hearing. Id. at 496.
101 S. Ct. at 414.
140Id. at 414-18.
"'

"' Id. at 419-20. The Court has expressly approved the "'offensive" use of collateral estoppel
by one who had been a stranger to the earlier law suit provided that two conditions are satisfied.
First, the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have had one prior "full and
fair" opportunity to litigate the issue involved. Second, the court must be satisfied, after a review
of all the facts and circumstances, that the application of collateral estoppel in the latter case is
fair and reasonable to all concerned. Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332-33 (1978).

,4 101 S. Ct. at 419-20.
"4 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Preise v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
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The Court did, however, ex-

pressly leave open three important and interesting issues.
First, the Court stopped far short of holding that the assertion of
a federal constitutional right in the course of defending a state criminal case (in this situation, a suppression hearing) is always a "full and
fair" opportunity to litigate the issue.' 5' More broadly, the Court
made no attempt to define the standards of collateral estoppel in
section 1983 situations, leaving to the lower courts the initial responsibility for developing guidelines on the subject.
Second, the Court failed to apply the decision to the case in
which the claimant intentionally or inadvertently fails to raise the
constitutional issue in the first lawsuit, although the majority opinion
seems to intimate a dim view of the claimant's position in such circumstances.

5 2
1

Finally, the Court expressly preserved, for litigants who win the
initial race to court, the possibility of insuring a federal bite at the
apple. 1 3 Although the federal court may then abstain pending the
outcome of state proceedings, the claimant may thereafter come back
to federal court for a trial of his section 1983 claims free of collateral
estoppel or res judicata problems.'5
Justice Blackmun dissented in Allen essentially because he felt
that the assertion of constitutional claims in a state court suppression
hearing could never satisfy the "full and fair opportunity to litigate"
standard in light of any realistic view of criminal defense decisions. 55 In his view, a state judge deciding whether to preclude
evidence in a criminal case is concerned with an entirely different
"remedy" (conviction of a crime as opposed to damages) and, in
deciding this "peripheral" issue, may well be under "institutional"
pressures in evaluating the effect his ruling will have upon the search
for truth in the criminal justice context. 156 Furthermore, he could see
no reason for supposing that the decision to raise the claim in the
criminal presecution was voluntary, in view of the overriding concerns of the immediate consequences of conviction. 1 57 In short, Jus"0 101 S. Ct. at 420.

'51See note 145 supra.
,52101 S.Ct. at 416 n. 10, 420 n.23. See also id. at 415 n.6, suggesting that Blonder-Tongue
Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill., 402 U.S. 313 (1971), and similar cases broadening the notion of
a claim for res judicata purposes, would also cut off the constitutional claim which could have
been, but was not, raised in state court.
153
101 S. Ct. at 418 n.17 (dictum).

"" Id. See notes 58-60 supra and accompanying text.
155101 S. Ct. at 425 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
156Id.

IsId. at 426 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The majority apparently agrees on this last point. Id.
at 420 n.23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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tice Blackmun simply found the difference in context between the two
proceedings to be so profound that the majority's suggestion of any
potential equivalence was absurd. As he put it:
The criminal defendant is an involuntary litigant in the state tribunal, and against him all the forces of the State are arrayed. To force
him to a choice between foregoing either a potential defense or a
federal forum for hearing his constitutional claim is fundamentally
unfair.'15

In addition, Justice Blackmun saw the majority's wholesale incorporation of collateral estoppel into the procedural law of civil
rights actions as a failure to give proper weight to the purposes behind
the Civil Rights Acts. In his view, "the Court repeatedly has recognized that section 1983 embodies a strong congressional policy in favor
of federal courts acting as the primary and final arbiters of constitutional rights." 59 On that basis alone, the dissent would not preclude
the federal courts from reviewing claims like McCurry's.
The effect of the Court's decision in Allen will depend in large
measure upon the inclination of the circuits to scrutinize the actual
factors confronting state criminal defendants in their assertion of
federal constitutional claims in state courts, as well as the nature of
the hearing afforded them in that context. Under Park Lane Hosiery
v. Shore, 60 collateral estoppel should not be used to summarily dispose of a claim merely because there has been previous litigation on
the general subject. Collateral estoppel should bar litigation only if
the court considering the defense is satisfied after an examination of
all the facts and circumstances that such a result is fair and just, and
that there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior action
or proceeding. Accordingly, the determination of necessity requires a
comprehensive review of the facts, far more than a cursory assessment
of the issues. In Allen, the claim was dismissed on summary judgment
before trial. Given the Court's recognition of the complex factual
issues involved, and given the express reservation concerning the precise scope of the ruling as it affected McCurry,' 6' the approval of
summary judgment is most problematical. Certainly a claim of collateral estoppel should not be permitted to prevent the plaintiff from

Id. at 426 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
Id. at 423 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting) (citing Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967);
McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)).
'6 439 U.S. 322, 332-33 (1978). See note 145 supra.
,8Specifically, the Court noted that "questions as to the scope of collateral estoppel with
respect to the particular issues in this case are not now before us." 101 S.Ct. at 414 n.2. Indeed,
"s
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seeking discovery in order to develop evidence in support of a claim
that the Park Lane requirements have not been met. If summary
judgment is to be granted in this situation, it should not be considered
until after discovery is complete and the parties are ready for trial.
Indeed, in those situations where there are facts raising Park Lane
questions, and in any criminal trial situation, one would find Justice
Blackmun's call for a per se rule most convincing. A hearing at, or
immediately before, the trial itself would be the most logical and fair
method of disposing of the issue.
D. Pre-trialDiscovery
The subject of pre-trial discovery has commanded a great deal of
attention as courts and attorneys 6 2 debate the serious problems
caused by liberal standards of relevancy,16 3 difficult problems of privilege, 6 4 and recurrent claims of persistent abuse by both discoverers
and their targets. 6 5 Modern discovery has become the battleground
on which most litigation is fought to its ultimate conclusion: settlement without trial. 66 For those with the financial resources, the
legal manpower, and the patience and persistence to utilize full dissome of the police conduct in McCurry's case had been found unlawful by the state courts
reviewing his conviction. Id. at 414.
362

See generally Discovery Symposium, 4 LmGATON (ABA) (fall 1977); Survey of Literature

From 1970 to the Present: Expressed Dissatisfactions and Proposed Reforms (Federal Judicial
Center 1978).
162Rule 26(b)(1) permits discovery of:

any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of any other party,
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objecting that the
information will be inadmissable at the trial if the information sought appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissable evidence.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
The courts have given broad scope to this provision. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495
(1947); United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958). See generally C. WRIGHT,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FmRL CouRTs § 81 (1970); Developments in the Law-Discovery,
74 H~Aav. L. REv. 940 (1961).
14 Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merely protects "privileged" information from discovery. In federal question cases, including civil rights actions, evidentiary privilege
is a matter of federal common law. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence makes no effort to catalogue or define the privileges. FED. R.EvID. 501.
165 See, e.g., Civil Discovery: How Bad are the Problems?, 67 A.B.A. J. 450 (1981) (account
of 1979 American Bar Foundation survey of Chicago based litigators who feel that courts are lax
in policing and punishing discovery abuses).
1668
Well over 90 % of civil cases filed are settled without trial. In some jurisdictions, the figures
exceed 95%. See M. RosENBmEG, J. WEINsrEIN, & H. SMrr, ELEMENTs OF CIVIL PRocEDURE 901
(1976).
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covery, the system seems to work. In the context of civil rights litigation, the subject of pre-trial discovery is subject to a fundamental
contradiction. In the greatest number of cases, there is little or no
discovery, because the plaintiff has neither the financial nor the legal
resources to conduct it. For the pro se litigant, discovery is simply an
incomprehensible morass, and most such plaintiffs do without it.
Even where the plaintiff has counsel, financial and caseload limitations most often keep discovery to a bare minimum. On the other
hand, in the major test case or the pitched battle between a political
organization or prominent public figure and the government, discovery may consume several years, involving dozens of depositions, hundreds of interrogatories, and thousands of documents, 6 7 just as one
would expect in antitrust or other complex litigation with myriad
factual and legal issues.
Generally, the procedural wrangles that arise during discovery
involve three types of issues: relevance, privilege, and abuse. Relevance has become so broad that it is difficult to find decisions limiting
discovery solely on that ground. 168 Discovery requests designed to
elicit evidence, to uncover and identify additional defendants or theories of liability, to rehearse or provide a foundation for cross examination and independent attacks upon credibility, and to determine insurance coverage and settlement discussions among other parties to
the litigation, are all "relevant" for discovery purposes.1 6 The question of abusive or burdensome discovery requests has been dealt with
on a case-by-case basis by judges and magistrates, taking into account
the needs and circumstances of the parties and applying the court's
sense of what is fair in the particular situation. 70
In the area of privilege, however, there is frequently an important and fundamental conflict between the civil rights plaintiff and
the government defendant. The plaintiff will want to discover internal memoranda, reports, and evaluations of the incident in order to
prove that the individual defendant intended to harm the plaintiff, or
knew that his conduct was unlawful. He will want to determine what
efforts have been made by officials to gauge the legality of their
conduct, such as seeking the advice of counsel. He will seek to ascer,' See, e.g., Dunn v. Midwestern Indem., 88 F.R.D. 191 (S.D. Ohio 1980). See generally
Burns v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973).
Z See note 161 supra.
See Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 72 F.R.D. 116 (S.D. Ohio 1976); Felix A.
Thillet, Inc. v. Kelley-Springfield Tire Co., 41 F.R.D. 55 (D.P.R. 1966); Cox v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 38 F.R.D. 396 (D.S.C. 1965); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
70 FE.
R. Civ. P. 2 6(c) permits the court to limit discovery to protect a person "'from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense."
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tain when management officials became aware of the conduct of
lower level employees in order to support a claim of authorization or
ratification. He will want to know what alternative courses were
available to and considered by the defendants, and whether they
considered their actions before taking them. He will attempt to discover if efforts were made to conceal or alter information to mislead
the public and/or high ranking officials. '71 In short, he wants to go
beyond the public facts to find out what actually happened, just as
does the plaintiff suing a hospital, an automobile manufacturer, or a
price-fixer. The defendant, of course, wants to keep all such information to itself, and has available two claims which are ideally suited to
the situation: the attorney-client privilege, one of the most sacrosanct
of all the common law privileges; and executive privilege, with vague
contours but boasting a constitutional foundation. 172
In passing upon claims of privilege in discovery, the court does
not have the "out" of permitting disclosure subject to exclusion of the
material at trial, because the disclosure itself is seen as a harmful
intrusion upon the defendant's rights. ,73 Accordingly, the court must
adopt some alternative approach to the problem. In addition to simply granting or denying all discovery, two other approaches have
evolved. The most common device is to require the objecting party to
submit the material for in camera inspection, with the judge or magistrate determining what is protected and passing the remainder along
to the plaintiff. 174 Another less common and more problematic device is to require the plaintiff to make an evidentiary showing of some
sort before permitting further discovery, i.e., by proving the constitutional violation before being allowed to seek proof of malice or knowledge. 175 In either case, the court must become involved with the
merits of the controversy in order to rule intelligently on the motion.
171The reasons for obtaining all these kinds of information were previously discussed in the
section dealing with substantive liability of various civil rights defendants. See notes 13-46 supra
and accompanying text. The actual wrongdoer is protected by qualified privilege so long as he
acts in good faith. This immunity may be overcome upon proof of malice, intent, or negligent
failure to know the applicable constitutional standards. All of these in turn require investigation
of internal documents and memoranda to establish state of mind, or knowledge, as of the time
the acts were committed. High ranking officials are liable only for actual authorization or

ratification of the wrongdoing of low level employees. Id. Entity liability is far more than a
matter of respondeat superior, but requires the plaintiff to show wrongful involvement on the
part of high ranking, policy-making officials in the government. See notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
172See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). See generally L. TRIBE, AMEIUCAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-14, at 202-12 (1978).
173 See Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
174 Id.
175Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
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Ultimately, the decision of the court on these privilege claims
may well determine the outcome of the case, since the material sought
has great potential to produce important evidence that will overcome
the qualified immunity and other special standards of liability in civil
rights actions.
1. Attorney-Client Privilege
As previously discussed, in most civil rights actions defendants
have only a qualified immunity for their wrongful actions. 176 This
qualified immunity may depend upon their having taken reasonable
measures to ascertain the current principles of constitutional law relevant to their activities. In Wood v. Strickland,'77 the Supreme Court
held that government officials with supervisory or managerial responsibilities are expected to know the established law relevant to their
area of responsibility, and to make reasonable efforts to keep up with
78
changes in that area.1
For a government official, the most obvious method of complying with this responsibility is to consult with counsel concerning potential constitutional issues when engaged in promulgating written
regulations or policy, delegating authority, conducting training programs for lower level employees, establishing reporting requirements
for subordinates, reviewing complaints, and the like. Although the
need to consult counsel is more pronounced in areas of extensive court
involvement such as prison and school administration, it would appear that all government officials may at least be expected to take
advantage of opportunities to get advice from government attorneys
assigned to their areas, since such consultation involves neither hardship nor individual expense for the official in question. Where such
advice is obtained, the official may be immune from liability even if
7
his actual analysis of the law is incorrect. 9
In areas of rapidly developing or unclear decisional law, the
defendant may base his qualified privilege defense on good faith
reliance upon the advice of counsel, particularly where specific inquiry is made before actual harm is caused to the eventual civil rights
plaintiffs. When this defense is put forth in the answer or in response
to interrogatories, the plaintiff quite properly will seek further infor-

178 See notes 13-18 supra and accompanying text.

177420 U.S. 308 (1975).
178Id. at 322.
"" There may, however, be questions concerning the liability of the entity for damages
though the individual enjoys a qualified immunity. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
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mation concerning the source, timing, and exact nature of the legal
advice relied upon as a basis for the claim of immunity.
Such an inquiry, however, will be met with a claim of
attorney-client privilege. Under rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, evidence which is privileged from disclosure at trial
is protected from discovery.18 0 The law of privilege is governed by
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 181 which, in cases involving federal
law questions, are a part of the body of federal common law. 182 As a
general matter, federal common law protects from disclosure communications made in confidence between an attorney and his client in
furtherance of the professional relationship, with exceptions for certain instances of criminal conduct or fraud upon the tribunal. 183
The conflict between the attorney-client privilege as a limitation
upon discovery and the assertion of immunity based upon advice of
counsel has received scant attention from the courts in civil rights
cases. This conflict may arise in several different contexts and poses
some interesting questions. In particular, (1) Are communications
between a government official and an attorney who acts as permanent, in-house staff counsel for the department within the zone of
attorney-client communications? (2) Does the attorney-client privilege apply to communications between a government official and a
government attorney who is a member of the Attorney General's
office or a separate department, or who is counsel to the agency or
entity and who becomes involved only at the point when litigation has
been commenced or is imminent? (3) What is the status of communications made to a government attorney who is charged with investigating conditions in a particular department at the request of the
legislature, the governor, or a grand jury? (4) In cases involving the
assertion of pendant state law claims in addition to the federal civil
rights claims, should the court apply state or federal rules in ascertaining the existence and scope of the privilege?
The first three issues have as their common nexus the relationship
between the government official and the full-time government attor-

180 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). See note 162 supra and accompanying text.

161FED. R. EvID. 501.
182 Id. Rule 501 distinguishes between cases in which the substantive decision is governed by
federal law and those in which it is based on state law, thus implementing the policy behind Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In the latter type of case, the federal courts are

instructed to "borrow" the law of privilege as recognized by the state whose substantive law will
govern the decision on the merits.
181ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 4, DR 4-101 and related
sections. While the attorney-client privilege is fundamental to the American legal system, it is
not of constitutional dimension. Like all other common law or statutory privileges, it is subject to
exceptions and limitations based upon policy and justice.
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ney who provides legal advice.' 8 4 The Supreme Court has not ruled
upon the nature and extent of the attorney-client privilege in this
context. However, in Upjohn Co. v. United States,'8 5 the Supreme
Court considered the problem of attorney-client privilege in the somewhat analogous area of officials and employees of private corporations. Although it upheld the claim of attorney-client privilege, the
Court refused to enunciate a general standard,""6 holding only that
the privilege would protect non-executive level corporate employees
where they had been instructed by management to cooperate with
87
counsel in providing information. 1
Application of the principles in Upjohn to the government official situation raises two problems. First, in Upjohn the corporation
was not basing its defense upon advice of counsel. Thus, the party
seeking discovery was not deprived of information directly relevant to
part of its substantive case. 8 8 Second, there exists in the government
situation at least the possibility that an official may seek the advice of
counsel solely to cover himself against liability for damages in an
improper attempt to create a zone of immunity for official action.
At least one lower court has held that in actions where advice of
counsel is the basis for defense, the attorney-client privilege is waived
by implication. In Hearn v. Rhay,189 the court, basing its ruling upon
an analysis of decisions in habeas corpus proceedings wherein prisoners asserted incomplete or improper advice of counsel as a basis for
their failure to resort to available state remedies,9 0 held that an
individual waives the attorney-client privilege by asserting it in connection with some claim relevant to the litigation, where the assertion
of the privilege would deprive the opponent of information vital to his
case.191
Where a government official has treated an individual in a manner which violates the constitution, he may escape liability for this

'"I It would be unusual for a government official confronted with a problem of constitutional
interpretation to consult private counsel, although he might wvell do so when the issue is conflict
of interest or claimed disability from holding office.
,ss101 S. Ct. 677 (1981).
,56Id. at 681, 686.
'"1Id. at 685-86.
161Indeed, in Upjohn the Internal Revenue Service had been provided with a preliminary
report discussing certain of the questionable payments. Upjohn Company had also provided the
government with the names of all persons responding to the questionaire. Id. at 681.
-- 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975). See Note, 22 WAYNE L. RE:v. 1451 (1976).
,1168 F.R.D. at 581. See Laughner v. United States, 373 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1967); Henderson
v. Heinze, 349 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1965).
'"' 68 F.R.D. at 581. The court went on, somewhat confusingly, to limit the decision by
ruling that -[a]
substantial showing of merit to plaintiff's case must be made before a court
should apply the exception to the attorney-client privilege defined herein." Id. at 582.
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error in judgment only upon a finding that he believed, reasonably
and in good faith, that his actions were indeed proper. 9 2 If he
intends to adduce evidence showing that advice of counsel was sought
prior to the acts complained of, he should not be permitted to claim
privilege in discovery and later waive the privilege selectively for his
193
own benefit.
There may even be some instances in which the defendant will
plead immunity under Gomez, 9 4 but maintain that the plaintiff has
the burden of proving his lack of good faith at the trial. In these
situations the plaintiff must have discovery concerning the source of
the purported legal advice, the time at which such advice was sought
and obtained, and any documentation of the advice which the defendant relied upon. In addition, the trial court should have discretion to permit additional discovery if there is any indication that the
defendant sought legal advice as a "cover" for improper action. This
approach would be roughly analogous to that currently utilized in the
federal courts regarding discovery of expert opinion testimony.1 95
The final issue, concerning rules of privilege in cases with both
federal and state law claims, has likewise received little attention in
the courts. Yet, this issue will arise with increasing frequency in future
cases because of the increased scope of civil rights actions coupled
with the expanding state law immunity developing in both case law
and state tort claims statutes. 9 6 In one district court case,19 7 the
court held that since the general policy of federal procedure rules
favors discovery and introduction into evidence of all relevant material, a court should simply refuse to recognize the more restrictive
privilege in cases involving related federal and state law claims. 9 8
Accordingly, the court did not recognize the privilege in the case
before it. It would appear that a similar approach in civil rights cases
is both sensible and practical.
2. Executive Privilege
If the action includes a claim against a government entity, substantive principles of law require the plaintiff to demonstrate the
See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
103 Cf. Rubenstein v. Klevin, 150 F. Supp. 47 (D. Mass. 1957) (in action by woman against
married man for breach of companionship agreement, defendant could not refuse to answer
incriminating questions and raise affirmative defense of illegality).
194 See notes 111-17 supra and accompanying text.
195FED. B. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
198See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2748 (1981).
107 FDIC v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 84 F.R.D. 345 (N.D. I11.1979).
198Id. at 349.
192
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involvement of high level officials in the pattern of wrongful conduct,
by promulgation of official policy, ratification or approval of the

wrongful conduct, or by failure to correct abuses.' 99 In addition,
when a claim of qualified immunity is made by the defense, it may be
overcome by showing actual malice, knowledge of wrongful conduct,

or intentional or careless disregard for developments in the constitutional law cases. 200 In both types of situations, the plaintiffs chances

for success at trial are directly dependent upon his ability to discover
evidence concerning the state of mind of those government officials

involved in the case. Attempts to discover this information, however,
are met by a claim of executive privilege, protecting the government
from unwarranted disclosures of the internal analytical and delibera20
tive functions of government. '
As in the attorney-client privilege situation, the question is
whether the claim of executive privilege must give way to the plaintiff's need to obtain essential relevant information. Although this issue
has not been discussed by the courts, there is a useful analogy in the
Supreme Court's decision in Herbertv. Lando.20 2 That case involved
a public figure defamation action, 20 3 and thus the plaintiff could
prevail only by showing that the published material was false and that
the defendant either knew it was false or published it in reckless
disregard of its truth or falsity.204 During discovery the plaintiff
sought to obtain internal information concerning decisions made in
the course of preparing the television program in question, and the
defense claimed the newsman's or journalist's privilege. 205 The Court

I" See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
110See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text.
201See Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1973). The Frankenhausercourt
described executive privilege as "the government's privilege to prevent disclosure of certain
information whose disclosures would be contrary to the public interest." Id. at 342. In order to
make a determination as to whether the executive privilege should apply, "the Court must
balance the public interest in the confidentiality of governmental information against the needs
of a litigant to obtain data, not other'wise available to him, with which to pursue a non-frivolous
cause of action." Id. at 344. See also Peck v. United States, 88 F.R.D. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
202 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
201 Anthony Herbert, a retired army officer became a public figure when he accused his
superior officers of covering up reports of "atrocities and other war crimes" during the Vietnam
War. CBS subsequently aired a program about Herbert produced by Barry Lando. Id. at 156.
Lando also published a magazine article about Herbert. Herbert then filed a defamation action
against Lando alleging "that the program and article falsely and maliciously portrayed him as a
liar and a person who had made war-crime charges to explain relief from command." Id.
101E.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Herbert conceded that he was a
public figure and, therefore, would have to meet the high standard of proof required in a
defamation action by the New York Times case. 441 U.S. at 156.
203 Id. at 157.
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held that since evidence of the defendants' state of mind was of central
importance to the plaintiff's case, the claim of privilege must give way
to the needs of the litigation. 2 6 Much of the Court's opinion is an
evaluation of the journalist's privilege and its relationship to the rights
of a defamed individual to seek compensation for the damage to his
reputation. Nonetheless, the parallel between this case and a civil
rights claim where the various defendants' states of mind are of central concern is clear, and Herbertmay well be extended into the civil
rights area.
CONCLUSION
Civil rights actions are probably the most controversial of all civil
legal proceedings. They are subject to abuse by those who seek to
harass the government or to obtain some transient notoriety. More
often, they are a valuable weapon for the attorney who is combatting
oppression, deprivation, or just plain indifference by those who are
vested with the powers of government. When courts permit peripheral procedural issues to slow down or divert the adjudication of civil
rights claims, they ratify the injustices committed by the defendants.
When a civil rights plaintiff seeks money damages, he confronts a
substantial barrier if he is to establish tort liability on the part of
individual and/or entity defendants. There is generally a large number of issues, both factual and legal. Information necessary for preparation of the case lies with the defendants themselves and is not
available elsewhere. The whole structure of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure dictates that a person in this situation be afforded the
opportunity (assuming he can afford to take advantage of it) to utilize
pre-trial discovery devices in an effort to obtain that information
before the court determines his entitlement to a full trial. Procedurally, this just result may be obtained by dealing with defense motions
at trial or on summary judgment after discovery, and not as motions
attacking the complaint. While this approach will not serve the indigent pro se litigant, it will materially assist the plaintiff's attorney by
eliminating much of the delay, confusion, and frustration that are
now characteristics of the federal civil rights action.
ma Id. at 174.

